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Secularity through a ‘Soft Distinction’ in the Islamic 
Ecumene? Adab as a Counterpoint to Shari‘a 
Armando Salvatore ∗ 
Abstract: »Säkularität durch eine ‚weiche Unterscheidung‘ in der islamischen 
Ökumene. Adab als Gegenpol zur Scharia«. This article highlights a ‘soft’ dis-
tinction in the regulation of human conduct which emerged through various 
epochs of Islamicate history: between adab as the marker of an ethical and lit-
erary tradition, on the one hand, and the normative claims covered by shari‘a 
and drawing particularly on the exemplary sayings of Prophet Muhammad, the 
hadith corpus, on the other. Adab became a counterpoint to the hadith-shari‘a 
discourse by relying on non-Prophetic and, in this sense, non-divine sources of 
knowledge. The first part of the study reconstructs the trajectory of adab in 
pre-colonial times while the second part explores crucial transformations oc-
curring under the impact of European colonial modernity, whose discourse 
propagated a strongly autonomous notion of secular civility. The interventions 
of several Muslim reformers of the era contributed to make adab the hub of an 
autochthonous type of secularity. Here adab still works as a marker of a soft 
distinction – only that it now becomes a ‘double distinction’: both between a 
mundane and a prophetic tradition within the Islamic ecumene, and between 
an emerging Muslim secularity and the European colonial one. 
Keywords: Secularity, civility, Islam, modernity, colonialism, adab, hadith, shari‘a. 
1.  Introduction: Religion, Distinction, Differentiation 
This study intervenes in the discussion on Islamicate secularities by focusing 
on a crucial, though ‘soft’ distinction, developed through various stages in the 
course of Islamicate history, which affected the regulation of human conduct. 
The outcome of this distinction was the way the ethical and literary tradition of 
adab worked as a harmonious counterpoint, more than a sheer alternative, to 
the normative discourse subsumed under the notion of shari‘a, the law originat-
ing from Divine will (shar‘). Adab operated thus, however, through clearly 
affirming a distinctive, non-divine source of norms of human interaction. The 
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article is divided up in two parts: the first delineates key traits of adab in pre-
colonial times, while the second focuses on some key transformations it un-
derwent during the colonial era. It should also be added that arguing in favor of 
a view of distinction that is not drastic but fraught with a good degree of am-
bivalence (mediated, as it were, by the plastic and malleable becoming of dis-
cursive traditions) should not be understood as a token of an ‘Islamic excep-
tion’ to norms of modern differentiation. As alluded to in the introduction to 
this HSR Special Issue, what may appear as ambivalent from a modern West-
ern scholarly viewpoint can be perfectly rational within the perspective of a 
non-Western tradition originating in the premodern era (Dressler, Salvatore, 
and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2019). Disambiguation strains only intervene in the tradi-
tion through the solicitations of Western cultural hegemony during the colonial 
epoch. 
The background to the ‘normalcy’ of this process of distinction unfolding 
within Islamicate history could be seen in the view, cultivated by an important 
branch of the comparative historical sociology of religions and civilizations, 
according to which religion in a variety of regions and civilizations differenti-
ated itself from cosmological holistic views and rituals during the so-called 
Axial Age (ca. 800-200 BCE). This Ur-differentiation of religion was facilitat-
ed by its main carriers (i.e., increasingly specialized religious personnel) most-
ly by invoking a transcendent realm, represented either by a personal God or an 
impersonal force. This was conceived as a realm that imposes norms of ethical 
and compassionate behavior on all members of a given collectivity, including 
its rulers. The operation, originally performed by a variety of prophets, philos-
ophers, and sages (from Isaiah through Plato to the Buddha), instituted a prin-
cipled autonomy of religion from other social fields. The carriers of religious 
visions aspired to embrace the entire human condition, torn between immanent 
interests and transcendent norms (Jaspers 1953 [1949]; Eisenstadt 1982).  
Over the long-term, this initial differentiation of religion opened up the so-
cial space to a cascade of further differentiations, which instituted the autono-
my of politics, the law, the economy, art, etc. via distinctions from comprehen-
sive religious claims. Yet while we observe such successive fields 
differentiating from religion and creating non-religious or secular spaces, dis-
courses, and institutions, the initial differentiation of religion from the archaic 
and holistic understanding of reality still operates, as it were, in the back-
ground. Too often, we take for granted this Ur-differentiation or forget it alto-
gether. On the other hand, the outcome of differentiation processes is rarely 
clear-cut and without residues, as sociological parlance often describes them. 
Often, degrees of ambivalence are observable, themselves functional to the 
operation of the relatively autonomous fields, and favoring their interfacing.  
Thus, the boundaries between fields are seldom drawn in the sharpest possi-
ble ways. This allows for grey areas that do not necessarily hinder, and may 
actually favor, an intermediation between the dynamics of the different fields 
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and a negotiation among their normative rationales. This is precisely what in 
several cases, located beyond the West and its modernity, prevents differentia-
tions of secular spaces and forms of action from becoming sharp and producing 
fully autonomous fields governed by specific values and norms. Differentia-
tions do occur, but they appear most often as soft, ambivalent, and hazy – like 
the one I shall explore here. Moreover, differentiation describes a process, 
while distinction points to its (relatively stable) outcome. In the case analyzed, 
it is more suitable to refer to the notion of discourses and practices bundled 
together within more or less coherent traditions rather than use the sociological 
metaphors of fields and spaces.  
2.  The Tradition of Adab in Pre-Colonial Times 
From quite early stages after the onset of the Islamicate civilization, one can 
observe the crystallization of two major discursive traditions, both of which 
consist of intersecting registers of narration, habitualization and, ultimately, 
normativity – albeit in a variety of combinations and degrees. They are the 
traditions associated with the idea of adab, which I shall define in some detail, 
and the tradition governed by hadith, the increasingly systematic body of re-
ports/narrations providing the quantitatively (and to a large extent also qualita-
tively) most solid ‘database’ to the entire normative system subsumed under 
the umbrella keyword of shari‘a. While hadith takes shape as a tradition origi-
nating from prophetic action and speech (through the narrative chain, habitual-
ization prism, and normative template initiated within Muhammad’s inner 
circle: Şentürk 2005; Hallaq 2013), the origins of adab are more fluid and 
mixed. This genre alternately evokes (pre-Islamic) Arab and Persian compo-
nents and ‘roots’. What is not contested is that it has no specifically prophetic 
origin. Adab, the non-prophetic tradition, primarily designated the quintessence 
of practical wisdom accumulated over the generations: the opposite, in princi-
ple, of a type of knowledge and practice originating in revelation. This non-
prophetic origin did not hinder it from harmonizing with the hadith tradition 
rather than clashing with it. However, the two traditions maintained a funda-
mental, mutual demarcation, even in the works of the scholars who eagerly and 
simultaneously cultivated both of them. As networked sets of narrations with 
their more or less certified transmitters, both traditions crystallized in late 
Umayyad/early ‘Abbasid’ times, between the 8th and 9th century CE, as exem-
plified by the work and career of the polymath Ibn Qutayba (d. 889; Bellino 
2016). Thus, a principled distinction was seldom over-emphasized. Hypotheti-
cally, we can talk about a ‘soft distinction’ linking (more than separating) the 
two traditions. 
Representing a type of practical wisdom acquired through learning, adab 
rapidly became a key Islamicate concept of etiquette and mastery of forms 
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(including, if not mainly, forms of life conduct). It designated the right, proper 
way to order and invest interests and values within social interaction. As fa-
mously defined by Barbara Metcalf, it provided “proper discrimination of 
correct order, behaviour and taste” (Metcalf 1984, 2). Adab was primarily 
cultivated by courtiers and literati within a variety of Islamicate courts and their 
attached bureaucracies, but it amounted to much more than self-complacent 
aristocratic refinement. Thus, one step further, the most general definition of 
adab would embrace the ensemble of the ethical and practical norms of virtu-
ous and beautiful life. Far from eclipsing with the collapse of the High Cali-
phate during the 10th century CE, adab became even more ubiquitous during 
the Islamicate Middle Periods (10th to 15th century), when it morphed into a 
key notion linking life conduct to the ways of governance and statecraft 
(siyasa). 
Siyasa is the concept we normally translate as “public policy” or simply 
“politics,” but which in fact circumscribes a borderline area of human activity 
that is both legitimized from within the jurisprudential dimension of the shari‘a 
tradition, and escapes it for demarcating the autonomy of rulers from a too rigid 
application of religious norms (March 2016). More broadly, siyasa is a key 
human practice helping subjects to deal with what, in a Machiavellian vocabu-
lary, we would call the conundrum of virtue and fortuna (Yavari 2014; Papas 
2018). By linking self-governance to siyasa, adab provides a narrative and 
normative umbrella to a proliferating grid of concepts, practices and institu-
tions that have been identified as potential carriers of a secular ethos of distinc-
tion within pre-colonial, Islamicate history. Often this proto-secular conceptual 
network matches the lukewarm, highly ambivalent reliance on shari‘a to be 
found in the “mirrors for princes” literature. The rise of dynastic law (yasa, 
qanun) within Mongol and Turkic empires fed into earlier contaminations of 
adab with siyasa. 
Notwithstanding such contaminations, adab legitimately intersected the core 
dynamics in the production of religious knowledge and throve alongside the 
shari‘a tradition and its norms based on Qur’an (Gilliot 1999) and, even more, 
hadith, which – we should not forget – is a narrative corpus through which the 
Prophet’s wisdom of character shines and becomes exemplary, and so norma-
tive. It is important to observe that unlike their Sasanian predecessors, pious 
merchants operating within the Islamic ecumene often had a share in the court 
culture where adab flourished, even while keeping an ambivalent relation to 
court milieus. This participation of non-aristocratic strata in adab contributed 
to an intense interfacing between adab and hadith. Qur’anic verses could be 
woven into the edifying stories of the adab genre such as the Kalila wa Dimna 
(an 8th century translation of ancient Indian fables), without however altering 
the inherently mundane teachings of the genre (Yavari 2014, 57). 
We could define adab as a discursive tradition in its own right, including 
aesthetical and entertaining dimensions alongside edifying and normative ones. 
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It stressed the requirements of civilized interaction at court, but also outside of 
it, namely with administrators and literati of other courts, with religious schol-
ars, with traders, etc. It taught a know-how that was integral to the building of 
social relations. Thus, more broadly, it also served the goal of conflict preven-
tion and social integration. It ultimately expressed style and distinction, in the 
sense famously elucidated by Pierre Bourdieu (1979), by emphasizing the need 
to acquire a knowledge of social complexity and of the nuances and vagaries of 
human interaction, which are caused by the proliferation of difference in taste, 
values, and interests among human beings. This knowledge of ‘social com-
merce’ also helps human subjects to maximize their own reputation by way of 
eloquence, good speech, and effective communication (Heck 2018). Such an 
approach is supported by the idea that good speech and elegant manners are not 
just an embellishment, but a necessary ingredient of good, cultured, civilized 
life. In turn, this is seen as a condition for developing a capacity for discern-
ment between good and bad, harmful and useful, pleasant and unpleasant – in 
what turns out to be at once practical reason and ethical formation, either of 
them independent in principle from the use of religious references. 
From the zenith of ‘Abbasid rule onwards, the two traditions of adab and 
hadith consolidated their normative grip over vast social strata in parallel to 
each other. One can in principle distinguish the culture and knowledge of the 
‘ulama’, the fuqaha’, and the muftis, which are largely dependent on hadith, on 
the one hand, and the adab court culture of the scribes and bureaucrats, on the 
other. Not surprisingly, Marshall Hodgson described the shar‘i culture as “pie-
ty-minded,” yet also suitable to regulate multiple aspects of social life, to facili-
tate the integration of various types of popular religiosity within a coherent 
institutional framework (Hodgson 1974, 273-5). Similarly, a cosmopolitan 
court culture, like the one that was built at the center of the ‘Abbasid Empire 
following the Sasanian model, never suppressed or replaced the knowledge that 
could be acquired by studying hadith and practicing fiqh with the support of 
Qur’anic piety (Arnason 2006, 45).  
Particularly some Sufi trends contributed to blend these two traditions, most 
notably during the transition between the Middle Periods and the modern era 
(Lapidus 1984; Papas 2008). Adab took root ever more solidly while being 
increasingly codified and practiced within a variety of Sufi brotherhoods, 
which thus contributed to interlacing court and government milieus, trader 
circles, and the ‘commoners’ (Papas 2018). In several cases, adab became a 
crucial concept not only for Sufi practice, but also for Sufi theory, in that it 
occupied a central place in several manuals addressed to aspirants and practi-
tioners. Sufi brotherhoods played a mediating role between the courts and the 
commoners. Sufi leaders were not just at the receiving end of a higher culture 
‘trickling down’ from the courts, but enriched it through their active presence 
within courtly milieus, while engaging in daily practice and dialogue with a 
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great variety of subjects and groups within society at large (Rahimi and Salva-
tore 2018). 
To summarize, we could say that the culture of adab, while initially radiat-
ing from court milieus, could embrace wider social groups, particularly thanks 
to its absorption by the higher middle strata, with commercial entrepreneurs 
playing a salient role. This class also showed a propensity to imitate and appro-
priate aristocratic life styles by acquiring the social prestige resulting from 
becoming patrons of the arts and sciences. Yet it was also because of the role 
played by some Sufi brotherhoods that the process was not merely unidirec-
tional or sharply vertical, as in the European cases studied by Norbert Elias 
(1983 [1969]; 2000 [1939; 1968].). It was more a case of appropriation and 
diffusion, across various milieus, of both the prestige-laden label of adab and 
the practices and disciplines of self-cultivation associated with it (Salvatore 
2016, 124-6). 
Playing more generally on this Eliasian analogy, one could argue that adab 
helped in providing a significant nexus between the cultivation of the self, on 
the one hand, and general ideas of integration of the body politic, on the other. 
This happened not only because adab provided an ethical grammar to the high 
bureaucracy, but also due to its frequent association with discourses on the 
“circle of justice” and/or through the previously mentioned genre of “mirrors 
for princes,” both of which contributed to the political literature of the epoch by 
defining virtues and duties of rulers and administrators. Within this wider field, 
incidentally, the use of hadith was not so rare and was often combined with 
tales of non-prophetic exemplary characters (see Yavari 2014). We might even 
observe a certain isomorphism between the adab and hadith traditions in 
matching character-building with ideas of a general (cosmological and socio-
political) order – a hypothesis that might reorient the analysis of the underlying 
discourse through targeted inquiries. 
In the process, adab assisted to complexify (and in a sense civilize) the pre-
dominantly military character of political rule during the Middle Periods, and 
also helped transform it during the transition to the early modern era via the 
emergence of an ever more self-conscious and assertive bureaucratic culture 
(Salvatore 2018). Especially after the advent of Mongol rule and the ensuing 
crystallization of a dualism between dynastic law (yasa) and the shari‘a, adab 
could work as a civilizing emollient on both sides. Thus, overall, the distinction 
innervated by adab was not unidirectional. When I suggest the existence of a 
soft distinction, I do not intend to state that the distinction excluded in principle 
a challenge to prophetic tradition, but rather to emphasize the process-like and 
open-ended character of the distinction. This could serve multiple goals by 
affecting both self-formation and social interactions (in this sense, being socio-
cultural, civic, and ethical) and by becoming influential at the level of govern-
ance via the issuing of rulings and decisions (so having a political and even 
legal significance). 
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This idea and practice of adab was also entertained by several religious 
scholars and enlivened parts of the hadith corpus itself, in spite of the fact that 
adab is a non-Qur’anic term. One hadith presents the Prophet as a champion of 
adab. Likewise, one can look at the fields of adab al-mufti, adab al-fatawa, 
and adab al-qadi, explicitly addressed to the practitioners of shari‘a law (Ma-
sud 1984). The key argument justifying such ultimate compatibility consisted 
in stressing that adab is ‘obviously’ Islamic, since it promotes virtue: as such, it 
cannot be against Islam. But such understandings, wherever available, are the 
outcome of a long-term absorption process that does not invalidate the princi-
pled autonomy of adab as a type of discourse originating and developing out-
side of the scriptural corpus – only that the distinction is soft and ambivalent, 
not hard and straightforward. 
Moreover, we can observe an internal differentiation within adab, and even 
adab operating as a factor of differentiation between various social functions 
and fields. The mother of all differentiation is in Adab al-dunya wa-l-din of al-
Mawardi (d. 1058), where adab is simultaneously, yet differentially applied to 
“the world” (al-dunya) with its complex relations and “the religion” (al-din) as 
the ethical pursuit of the hereafter. However, this malleability of adab also 
included a promise of reconciliation of differences, as evident in al-Ghazali (d. 
1111), for whom the adab of the self and the adab of political community 
basically coincided. On the other hand, in his famous Ihya ‘ulum al-din, adab-
related chapters are divided up into discrete sections like between adab al-akl 
(food), adab al-nikah (marriage), and al-adab fi-l-mujalasa (courtly, polite 
society), but also adab tilawat al-Qur’an (Qur’an recitation). The consequence 
is that adab is essentially a method (or even a metanorm) more than a sheer 
norm, to be applied to all aspects of life, including the fields regulated by the 
religious sciences and the shari‘a (Bonebakker 1990, 24-5; Leder 2011). 
In the same way in which the Islamic ecumene is larger than the Islamic re-
ligious community proper (the umma), there seems to be an ethical code that 
the religious scholars themselves have to acknowledge as having a broader 
purchase than the religious law. Therefore, fuqaha’ who are well-versed in 
adab will have better capacities to read and interpret Qur’an and hadith. More-
over, adab was addressed to rulers and their key advisors and viziers/ministers, 
with a frequent emphasis on the virtue of self-restraint and the rational control 
of passions that are instrumental to implementing a viable statecraft (as it hap-
pens in the previously mentioned, often ambivalent “mirror” genre: Yavari 
2014). Accordingly, we have adab al-muluk (kings), adab al-sultaniyya (sul-
tanate), and adab al-wuzara’ (ministers). Adab was addressed to the leaders 
and their followers, to the “big” (adab al-kabir) and to the “small” ones (adab 
al-saghir) within society and politics, measured in terms of power and social 
standing (Walker 2011, 106; Hartung 2011, 302-3). 
One can hypothesize that this regulating impetus of the adab tradition was 
driven by the perception among cultural elites of various epochs that the nor-
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mative import of shari‘a, while being essential in keeping together the Islamic 
ecumene, could not be self-sufficient in the task of governing its complexity 
and the increasingly intricate relations with its partners and foes. We could see 
the traditions of shari‘a and adab as not building a stale symmetric binary, but 
as engaging in a continuous mutual accommodation through which each could 
be constructed as the internal limit of the other: while devotion to the shari‘a 
and its implementation required the civilizing restraint of adab, adab in turn 
could not openly contravene shari‘a, not merely due to the latter’s sacredness, 
but because civility without morality risks becoming an empty shell. To 
abridge the intersecting trajectories of the two traditions within the pre-colonial 
Islamic ecumene, we could say that rather than searching for forms of the secu-
lar as distinguished from religion, we can identify socio-cultural forms deline-
ating ways of soft distinction between a corpus of norms of prophetic origin 
constituting the umma (the community of the faithful proper), and a type of 
civil ethic innervating a ‘civilizing process’ of sorts, providing a scaffolding to 
both the competitive and the cohesive dimensions of social life in the Islamic 
ecumene. 
During pre-colonial times, within the wide and internally diversified realms 
of the ecumene, means of distinction remained largely open-ended and allowed 
for a fluid process of continuous demarcations and re-amalgamations. Moreo-
ver, whatever kind of distinction might seem to emerge which we could identi-
fy as proto-secular, it acquires a narrative and a habitualized form rather than a 
normative armature, a form embedded in knowledge of the nuances and ambiv-
alences of social life. This finding matches the hypothesis that we face “differ-
ent levels of sharpness and quality of distinction” when we move beyond the 
West and beyond colonial modernity (Wohlrab-Sahr and Kleine 2016). This 
hypothesis also resonates with the view of Thomas Bauer, who, by stressing the 
Islamic (or Islamicate) “culture of ambiguity,” helps shed light on an in-built 
capacity of Muslim historic actors to distinguish spaces and concepts without 
creating irreversible institutional differentiations (Bauer 2011). This capacity is 
not a pale prefiguration of processes that will finally usher in a sharp discursive 
and institutional differentiation, with the advent of colonial, Western-
dominated modernity. The dense interfacing and mutual ‘irritation’ between the 
two traditions appear more meaningful if we adopt an approach stressing the 
socially constructive side of the “culture of ambiguity” rather than sign up to a 
paradigm of differentiation enshrined by subsequent waves of Eurocentric 
modernization theory. As I have argued elsewhere, given the historical and 
geopolitical centrality of the Islamic ecumene, these processes would make for 
a more plausible benchmark than the ‘Westernist’ armamentarium of concepts 
of the ‘secular’ and cognates, also for the sake of interregional comparisons 
(Salvatore 2016). 
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3.  The Metamorphosis of Adab during the Colonial Era 
The relationship between the adab and shari‘a traditions was subjected to 
strains and changes during colonial and post-colonial times without ever pro-
ducing a linear transformation toward a ‘hard distinction’ of religion vs. secu-
larity. It is rather that the two traditions could no longer quite harmoniously 
(and often tacitly) co-exist and interact. Starting in the late 19th century, sever-
al Muslim reformers saw themselves compelled to essentialize shari‘a into a 
quite systemic normative idea. They often did so by defining shari‘a as “Islam-
ic law” (Buskens and Dupret 2015) and by emancipating it from the hadith 
corpus, where the narrative and the normative dimensions are tightly inter-
twined. Often the most culturally knowledgeable among Muslim reformers 
were also led to clarify the mutual relations between shari‘a and adab, an oper-
ation that in a few cases pushed them to subsume one under the other. And 
moving toward the 20th century, shari‘a happened to take the upper hand: a 
shari‘a now increasingly ‘purified’ from its historic reliance on the hadith 
corpus, where its normative content was aligned with narration and habitus and 
was therefore particularly porous to adab. 
At this historical juncture one even has the impression that shari‘a leaps out 
of its ‘discursively’ normative armature altogether to become a sort of pure 
metanorm (Salvatore 1998). Curiously, however, adab seems to undergo a 
similar process, to the extent that Muslim reform discourse molded it into an 
abstract value or ideal of proper, civilized, modern behavior. This development 
unfolded in the context of the rise of a print-based public sphere that favored 
conceptual abstraction over narration and habitualization. Such a public sphere 
largely operated under the aegis of colonial patterns of governance. Within this 
public sphere, both traditions were reframed on the basis of their potential to 
help redeploy the type of subjectivity and governmentality that was in high 
demand within the new colonial settings (Mitchell 1991 [1988]).  
However, during the first half of the 19th century in the Egypt of Mehmet 
Ali, not yet subjected to direct colonial pressures and interventions but commit-
ted to ideas of modernization influenced by European models, the leading 
scholar and reformer al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was still able to reconstruct a 
precarious balance between shari‘a and adab. In classic theories of the body 
politic, adab operated as the knowledge code inspiring the proper execution of 
the differentiated tasks of the various organs and limbs of the body. In his 
Manahij al-albab fi mabahij al-adab al ‘asriyya, al-Tahtawi reworked this 
classic trope in ways that transformed the adab, traditionally incumbent on 
both the ruler and the subjects, into a unitary engine of self-control now specif-
ically centered on the hearts (albab) of the “people,” an emergent category of a 
proto-nationalist dictionary. As shown in a recent study by Ellen McLarney, al-
Tahtawi transformed adab by referring to modern French concepts like liberty, 
equality, and fraternity, but also, and most crucially, to the Islamic concepts of 
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justice and political participation/consultation (McLarney 2016, 25). Politics 
(siyasa) was no longer considered an exclusive prerogative of the ruler. It be-
came a legitimate field of interest and action for his subjects. 
The contemporary adab theorized by al-Tahtawi, or “adab of the age” (al-
adab al-‘asriyya), is ever more centered on the self-mastery of individual citi-
zens (ibid., 31) but is also of growing importance for politics (ibid., 34). The 
connection between adab and siyasa pre-dated the colonial era, as previously 
noted. But now within siyasa the individual subject is prioritized over the ruler 
and his court and becomes the centerpiece of a process of reflective self-
construction. This shift resonates with the idea of the civilizing process of 
Elias, or, according to an author like Tim Mitchell, with a Foucaultian view of 
the capillarity of power and its circulation, with subjects acting as nodes in the 
social system (Mitchell 1991 [1988]). Interestingly, al-Tahtawi transformed 
adab by also resorting to the metaphor of the inner forum, or inner court, of the 
subject as the hub of ethics, which had provided a key trope to European 18th 
century political philosophy (see Koselleck 1988 [1959]). More generally, as 
put by Ellen McLarney, al-Tahtawi “maps – or translates – the adab of one 
sphere into the adab of another” (McLarney 2016, 37), from individual creativ-
ity through the learning of proper linguistic skills to bodily composure and 
discipline (ibid., 42). 
Al-Tahtawi also advocated the cultivation of language, intended as proper 
speech, being no longer a prerogative of the courtier and administrator, but now 
a set of skills to be taught to a wider public. He implemented this program by 
undertaking linguistic interventions and reforms, helping to move from an 
elite-centered Arabic lexicon to a discourse and dictionary that could be appro-
priated and shared by the general public (ibid., 36). Interestingly, al-Tahtawi, 
after training as an ‘alim, became an expert in translation (particularly from 
French to Arabic). Developing such translation skills required the strengthening 
of his classical Arabic, a task considered co-essential to cultivating the literary 
dimension of adab. He contributed to the creation of the new socio-political 
Arabic lexicon and was also the editor of the first official, printed government 
bulletin in Egypt. These initiatives were urgently needed to inaugurate a pro-
gram of higher education on a larger scale, located outside the traditional sys-
tem of instruction controlled by religious scholars. The new Arabic lexicon was 
also instrumental in inspiring the first print media of the age (ibid., 27-8).  
We can see here a process of adaptation and appropriation of earlier mean-
ings of adab in order to cope with European colonial modernity, which was 
increasingly married to a strong notion of secularity. Therefore, interventions 
like those of al-Tahtawi can be interpreted as finalized to define an autochtho-
nous type of secular civility whereby adab still works, as in precolonial times, 
as the marker of a soft distinction – only that this time it is a ‘double distinc-
tion’: both between a mundane and a prophetic tradition within the Islamic 
ecumene and between the emerging patterns of Muslim secularity and the 
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European, colonial, hegemonic one (Salvatore 1997, 41-79). But what is most 
remarkable at this juncture is that the previously diffuse working of adab as a 
metanorm of good conduct serving a variety of social and political roles (in-
cluding those of religious personnel) becomes now much more explicitly inte-
grated within the civilizational project articulated by the Muslim reform dis-
course. This project challenged the European colonial hegemony and agenda of 
what was called a “civilizing mission” addressed to non-European populations.  
The focus of this adab becoming the marker of a modern Muslim secularity 
is increasingly laid on ‘educational’ patterns of reciprocity, as in the relation 
between the ‘ulama and the muta‘allimun, i.e., the teachers and the stu-
dents/learners, but also between parents and children, and rulers and citizens. In 
such relationships, adab facilitates balancing mutual duties, and at times be-
comes the source of an autonomous discourse of rights, which the shari‘a 
tradition had not shunned but formulated in quite oblique ways. Al-Tahtawi 
also comes pretty close to formulating adab in terms of freedom, equality, and 
fraternity (yet matched by mercy and compassion). He was quite explicit in 
grounding the adab of freedom in terms of a broadly natural rather than strictly 
divine law (McLarney 2016, 37). Accordingly, the way adab could be distin-
guished from shari‘a was subjected to significant changes in comparison with 
the precolonial era. The previously crystallized ‘soft distinction’ was not actu-
ally hardened, but remolded in ways that started to expose the two traditions to 
a continual, mutual, explicit attrition. The emerging consciousness of the attri-
tion between a now ‘religious’ and a ‘secular’ tradition affected the further 
course of the reform process starting from the second half of the 19th century 
and progressing onwards.  
The ‘ulama’, a category that, for al-Tahtawi, was not restricted to religious 
scholars, were redefined as precisely those teachers who secure this adab of 
freedom from oppression, being the main interpreters and teachers (or dissemi-
nators) of adab to the general public. In parallel, the ethic of citizenship was 
increasingly anchored in the virtuous consciousness of the individual, regard-
less of social class and level of instruction (ibid., 38). This is a big transfor-
mation but does not amount to the sudden emergence of a class of secular intel-
lectuals opposing (or competing with) religious scholars. Interestingly, this 
change is facilitated by retrieving the traditional metaphor of the “heart,” which 
now explicitly mediates between the private sphere of the inner forum and the 
public realm of responsibilities for the nation (ibid., 39).  
It is also important to note that in spite of his deep knowledge of French 
concepts, and particularly of the French modern political dictionary, al-Tahtawi 
insisted on molding his vision on the basis of the traditional vocabulary of adab 
(ibid., 40). Accordingly, the ‘ulama’ are now tasked with teaching adab al-
mu’asharat, i.e., the adab of social relations. And here tanwir, “enlighten-
ment,” comes onto the scene. The ‘ulama’ should enlighten the people, the 
citizens, and the common men into knowing their rights and learning self-
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mastery. The main instrument of tanwir is ta’dib, the verbal noun that desig-
nates the enforcement of adab as a program of disciplining and training (ibid., 
41). Dynamizing adab as ta’dib, as an educational-disciplining process and 
project, facilitates building a link to the emerging concept of tamaddun, a quite 
explicit match to the notion of ‘civilizing process.’ Becoming popular in the 
second half of the 19th century, this keyword explicitly reflected, on a linguis-
tic level, the process-like character of the transformation and its investment into 
urban modes of behavior (Gasper 2008). 
Contemporary with al-Tahtawi, the wave of Ottoman reforms known as tan-
zimat also favored a reformulation of adab (edep in Ottoman Turkish) as a 
larger and more inclusive cultural tool than a shari‘a-based social discourse, 
one suitable to educate and civilize the entire political community, and deliver 
it from ignorance and error. Some scholars have referred to the use of adab in 
the 19th century as an ‘invented tradition,’ but others, starting with Şerif Mar-
din, have preferred to stress a stronger line of continuity of adab culture among 
the Ottoman ruling elites from the zenith of the empire in the 16th century up 
to the so-called long Ottoman century, the 19th. Indeed, the reforms themselves 
did not start with the tanzimat but much earlier, in the 18th century, and elite 
criticism of the stagnation of the empire even earlier than that. Among key 
Ottoman scholars and personalities associated with this development of edep, 
we should remember Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895) and Ahmet Midhat 
(1844-1912) who authored Adab-i-muasheret (“The adab of social relations”), 
where Midhat stressed forms of propriety, also comparing Western and Otto-
man norms of behavior (Mardin 2006). 
Overall, in Egypt as in the center of the Ottoman Empire and in other parts 
of what by this time was called the “Muslim world” (Aydin 2017), there was a 
proliferation of attempts to upgrade the narrative and normative culture of adab 
into the matrix of a rather self-sustaining civilizing project. This consisted in 
reconstructing, from the top down, viable patterns of secular civility and be-
longing, catering to an ever more differentiated grid of social classes and 
groups. Among the vast array of measures affecting such fields were the re-
forms of the military, finance and the law, the institution of schools for aspiring 
civil servants, and the launch of identity cards or papers. Such measures exem-
plify the extent to which the practical dimension of reform was matched by a 
quite vocal concern with collective representation, which could often rely on a 
reconstructed and even potentiated view of adab. 
From the end of the 19th century until he 1920s, a further push in the recon-
struction of adab was effected by deepening and rephrasing the teachings of 
key classic authors (like the previously mentioned al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi, 
but also Miskawayh and Ibn Khaldun) who had articulated adab as a complex 
code innervating ways of being and appearing, and for managing their mutual 
tensions. This area of intellectual endeavor and public discourse produced 
increasing distinctions among the adab of different, often very specific issue-
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defined fields: as between an adab providing instruction on how to cope with 
military occupation, how to educate children, how to be a wise consumer, how 
to cut up an artichoke, or how to keep a distance from one’s partner in a polka, 
but also how to avoid an excessive display of one’s own religiosity in public. 
Adab became a compass providing orientation to the complex work of govern-
ing a dizzying variety of civilized self-other relationships (Farag 2001). 
Values that were increasingly functional to novel, colonial modes of devel-
opment, like saving and hygiene, or knowing one’s own rights, received ever 
more attention. At this juncture one could detect resonances with the earlier 
Scottish discourse on the “moral sense” as the key to a civil society of mutual 
others (Salvatore 2018). It is at this late-colonial stage that adab’s contempora-
neity prevailed over any attempt to provide a unitary, essential, or even genea-
logical definition of it. Adab proliferated through a common register applied to 
a differentiating social world. It became the main arrow of the educational-
civilizing project of several leading Muslim reformers and increasingly central 
to the emerging elite represented by those teaching the teachers, i.e., the new 
pedagogical masters. Often graduates of the Cairene new schools like the Taw-
fiqiyya or Dar al-‘ulum (founded 1872), and also influenced by al-Tahtawi, 
these were also authors of textbooks, and were frequently sent with grants to 
higher learning institutions in France or England (Farag 2011). 
Adab is now central to a pedagogical project to educate and civilize the 
members of the watan (“homeland” or “nation”) often via a kind of neo-
organicist discourse deployed through the grids of what at the same time Durk-
heim and his school were defining as a social division of labor approaching 
organic solidarity. Another author of the late 19th century, al-Marsafi (1815-
1890), made adab the key to the civility of both the subjects and the rulers. The 
implication of this move was that, without a sound articulation of adab, there 
could be no sound implementation of shari‘a either. Muslim public intellectu-
als voiced worries that the reform of the educational system occurring in a 
colonial situation might actually end up shaping citizens who are merely func-
tional to the interests of the colonial state but dysfunctional to the concerns of 
their communities. Adab becomes the key to offset this worry. This discourse 
also rejects the definition of adab as “literature” that European orientalists were 
starting to promote (Allan 2016). According to the Egyptian sociologist Iman 
Farag, this adab discourse also became the main conduit through which the 
autonomization and the institutionalization of the social sciences and humani-
ties were legitimized within higher education in Egypt in the course of the 20th 
century. As al-Marsafi wrote, “Do not believe that adab, as the crowd imagi-
nes, consists of poems, anecdotes, tales and similar things” (Farag 2001, 98). 
By opening up to ideas of participation in a modern and increasingly acces-
sible public sphere, adab provided the foundation stone to the articulation of an 
original conceptualization of social intercourse. This is where shari‘a re-enters 
the normative field. While in the first half of the 19th century al-Tahtawi could 
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still be seen as a champion of the disciplining impetus of an autarchic yet mod-
ern state formation, another late 19th century prolific Egyptian author, al-
Nadim (1845-1896), gained recognition as a leading public educator by explic-
itly acknowledging the Western challenge. He developed a consciously antago-
nist stance towards colonial European cultures based on a reformed and re-
forming, civic type of Islam (Farag 2001, Gasper 2008). The recombination of 
the two traditions of adab and shari‘a occurs now within a field of permanent 
tension between the notions and rationalities deployed within Islamic traditions 
and the modern norms and disciplines of a centralizing state intent on legal 
reform, supported by the power of modern positive law. 
Al-Nadim stands out as one major disseminator of a strong disciplinary no-
tion of adab that is intended explicitly as a type of internalized civility called to 
facilitate the implementation of shari‘a’s normativity. Yet with al-Nadim, the 
concept of adab also reflects an ethic of respect for the sensibilities of the 
members of other autochthonous, non-Muslim religious communities like 
Christians and Jews. Clearly the involvement of shari‘a in such a radically 
renewed discourse of adab purported momentous changes for the conceptions 
and implementations of shari‘a itself within the reformist discourse and, later, 
from the 1920s onwards, with regard to the rise of Islamism. Trying to summa-
rize the new relationship, we can say that, while adab is now conceived as the 
practical motor of the civilizing process, shari‘a works increasingly as its ideo-
logical ‘rotor.’ In the process, the latter becomes ever more essentialized and, 
in its public propagation as Islamic normativity, severed from its traditional 
narrative framework and habitualizing prism. It is not by chance that many 
reformers called for going back to the Qur’an – a call entailing a marginaliza-
tion of hadith. 
4. Conclusion: Continuities and Breakthroughs in the 
Working of Adab 
In this long trajectory, we have observed a proliferating variety of forms of 
adab expressing ideas and practices of civility. The process sharply accelerated 
during the colonial era and led to imparting a soft secular connotation to adab, 
also (if not even more) when a coordination with shari’a was attempted. How-
ever, factors of continuity also stand out in the trajectory. The most significant 
seem to be: 
1) a principled reliance on non-prophetic, hence fundamentally ‘non-
religious’ sources; 
2) the function of regulation of life conduct (‘values’) via appeal to a collec-
tive ideal of ethical life, deployed from the inside out with the aid of ex-
emplary models to be followed; 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  49 
3) an often tacit work of restraining potential excesses in the implementa-
tion of shari‘a both from without (social relations) and from within (the 
self) 
In this long-drawn-out process, we see an increasing blurring of adab as an 
emic concept with etic notions of secular civility. As shown by Farag (2001), 
this also happens via the interaction of the adab discourse with incipient social 
science paradigms (most notably influenced by Durkheimian ideas). 
As I have shown in this essay, we have to do here with a process of ‘secular 
encapsulation’ of a strong ‘value rationalization’ narrative within Islamic tradi-
tions, rather than with an outright secular differentiation from Islamic tradi-
tions. Adab works as a metanormative core or capsule, radiating on the norma-
tive field, which is still largely covered by shari‘a discourse. We might even 
dare to say that, throughout this process, Islamicate civilization should be seen 
as possessing a secular ‘core’ (Bellah 1991 [1970], 146-67). This may also 
explain why, especially since the beginning of the 20th century, several socio-
political forces have positioned themselves to resist, though not unconditional-
ly, the harder secular differentiation promoted by the forces of colonial and 
post-colonial modernity. 
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